The Escalation Ladder Has No Exit
Thousands of Marines are heading toward the Persian Gulf. Let it be on record that we knew what we were sending them into and what for — and sent them anyway.
Before we go any further: yes, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a repressive theocracy. Yes, they fund proxies across the region. Yes, they have spent decades as an adversary of the United States and Israel. None of that is in dispute here.
This article is not about whether Iran is a good actor. It is about whether the United States — its people, its economy, its men and women in uniform — had anything to gain from this war, and whether it was started honestly. Those are two different questions from the first one. If conflating them was your instinct just now, this article is written for you.
Where We Are Now
It has been three weeks since the first American bombs fell on Iran. Here is the current situation, as of this writing.
Two Marine Expeditionary Units — the 31st MEU aboard the USS Tripoli and the 11th MEU aboard the USS Boxer — are en route to the Persian Gulf on an accelerated deployment schedule.1 Combined, they carry approximately 4,700 to 5,000 Marines. The operation has a name: Epic Fury. The Pentagon has made detailed preparations for deploying U.S. ground forces into Iran. Senior military commanders have submitted specific requests for that option.2 President Trump, when asked directly on March 19 whether he would deploy troops, said: "No. I'm not putting troops anywhere."¹
Also on March 19, the United States launched an aerial campaign to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, through which Iran had effectively closed 20% of the world's oil supply.¹ Also on March 20, Trump posted on Truth Social that "we are getting very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down our great Military efforts."²
Both of these things are simultaneously true.
The Escalation Ladder
The war began on February 28, when the United States and Israel launched coordinated surprise strikes on Iran. Iran's response was immediate and broad: within 24 hours, it had struck nine countries. Within a week, fourteen.3 Iranian missiles and drones hit Israel, five Gulf Cooperation Council states, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Cyprus — including a British air base — and Azerbaijan. An Iranian ballistic missile triggered NATO air defense systems in Turkey.³
Iran then mined the Strait of Hormuz. It claims complete control of the waterway. Nearly all commercial traffic has ground to a halt.¹
On March 13, U.S. Central Command executed what it described as "a large-scale precision strike on Kharg Island, Iran," destroying "naval mine storage facilities, missile storage bunkers, and multiple other military sites." CENTCOM confirmed more than 90 Iranian military targets struck in a single night.4 The strikes destroyed the island's runway, its naval base, its air defense installations, and its mine storage — the precise infrastructure you neutralize before an amphibious assault. The oil infrastructure was left untouched. That evening, President Trump posted that he had "chosen NOT to wipe out the Oil Infrastructure on the Island" — and that should Iran interfere with passage through the Strait of Hormuz, he would "immediately reconsider this decision."⁴
As of this Saturday, at least 13 American service members have been killed and 232 wounded.²
Iran's Strategy
Iran is not trying to win this war in any conventional sense. It is running a strategy of deliberate, sustainable attrition — and that strategy is working.
The clearest window into how Iran is thinking comes from one data point: the desalination plants. When the United States struck a desalination facility in Iran, Tehran responded the next day by striking a desalination plant in Bahrain.³ One for one. Category for category. The message was precise: every target class you open, we open the same class on your allies — allies who, in the case of the Gulf states, have far more gleaming, irreplaceable infrastructure to lose than Iran does.
This is not impulsive retaliation. It is a doctrine.
Meanwhile, Iran has established what amounts to a toll road through its own territorial waters — an IRGC-vetted corridor allowing vetted vessels from China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and Malaysia to transit while the Strait remains effectively closed to everyone else.³ Iran blocked the world's oil supply. Iran is still selling its own oil. And because Iran caused the price spike, it is now selling that oil at prices it would never have commanded before the war began.
Then there is the drone math. A Shahed-136 costs somewhere between $20,000 and $50,000 to produce. A single Patriot interceptor costs approximately $4 million. A THAAD interceptor runs between $12.7 and $15.5 million. Iran, according to a UK Foreign Office-funded research group, has the industrial capacity to produce approximately 10,000 Shaheds per month.5 The drone launches from an angled rail mounted on a pickup truck. It requires no fixed launch facility, no dedicated storage, no infrastructure that generates a detectable signature. In the words of analysts at War on the Rocks: "In many cases, there may simply be nothing observable to target."⁵
On March 10, Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, announced at a Pentagon briefing that Iranian drone launches had decreased 83 percent since the beginning of the operation — evidence, he said, that U.S. strikes were "systematically dismantling Tehran's ability to threaten the Gulf." Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called it a demonstration of "efficacy."⁵
The day after that briefing, Iran conducted what it described as its 37th wave of attacks, striking targets across Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman simultaneously, while also hitting multiple vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.⁵
Hegseth had said something else at that briefing, perhaps without fully appreciating its significance: "If the enemy can simply wait and then project power, that's problematic."⁵
He is correct. That is exactly what Iran is doing.
The Economic Cost — Already Here
The numbers below describe the situation before a single Marine sets foot on Iranian soil.
Brent crude oil briefly topped $119 a barrel before settling near $112 — a 57% increase in one month.¹ The national average for a gallon of regular gasoline in the United States was $2.98 the day before the war started. As of this Saturday, it stands at $3.90 — a 31% increase in three weeks.6 Diesel, which powers the trucks that move every consumer good in America, has risen 28%, to $4.83 a gallon.7
In Europe, the situation is worse. The TTF benchmark for natural gas has risen 88% in one month. UK gas prices are up nearly 97%. Heating oil has more than doubled year-over-year.8 The head of the International Energy Agency, Fatih Birol, called this "the greatest global energy security threat in history" — noting that more oil has been lost than during the twin shocks of the 1970s, and that the volume of gas cut off by the fighting is twice what Europe lost from Russia in 2022.9 The IEA has released 400 million barrels from global strategic reserves. That represents 20% of its total holdings. Eighty percent remains.⁹
The disruption is not limited to energy. Thirty percent of the world's fertilizer supply moves through the Strait of Hormuz.10 Unlike oil, there is no internationally coordinated strategic reserve for nitrogen fertilizer.¹⁰ Key raw materials — helium for semiconductor manufacturing, sulfur for fertilizer production, petrochemical feedstocks for plastics and manufacturing — have been obstructed.¹ Qatar's Ras Laffan Industrial City, the world's largest LNG export facility, was struck and forced to reduce export capacity by 17%, with damage that will take up to five years to repair.¹ ² Iraq has declared force majeure on all oilfields developed by foreign oil companies.²
JPMorgan economists have projected that U.S. inflation could rise from 2.4% in January to 3% or higher.⁷ One economist estimated that monthly inflation in March alone could hit 1% — "the highest monthly increase in four years."⁷
And then there is this: the World Food Programme estimates that almost 45 million more people could be pushed into acute hunger if this conflict does not end by midyear — on top of the 318 million people worldwide who were already food-insecure before the war began.¹⁰ WFP's largest humanitarian operation, in Sudan, where more than 21 million people currently do not have enough to eat, depends on grain shipped from India through the Red Sea. Those ships are now rerouting 9,000 kilometers around Africa. Risk insurance has risen to between $2,000 and $4,000 per container.¹⁰
This is where we are. It is the third week of the war, no American has yet set foot in Iran, and the IEA is recommending working from home, avoiding air travel, and reducing highway speed limits — measures, it noted, "last seen in the 1970s."⁹
Where We Are Going
The Kharg Island Trap
Kharg Island sits approximately 15 miles off the Iranian coast in the northern Persian Gulf. It handles roughly 90% of Iran's crude oil exports — $53 billion in net annual revenues, approximately 11% of Iran's GDP.⁴ Its deep-water berths are irreplaceable; no other Iranian port can accommodate the large oil tankers that load there.⁴ It is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, protected by hardened air defenses, reinforced underground storage tanks, and fortifications built over four decades specifically to survive exactly the kind of assault now being contemplated.
The Iran-Iraq War is instructive here. Throughout the 1980s, Iraqi forces carried out repeated bombing raids on Kharg Island's oil facilities. They caused significant damage. Iran repaired the facilities and kept its oil shipments flowing every time. In the decades since, Tehran drew the lesson and hardened Kharg accordingly.⁴
The March 13 strikes destroyed Kharg's runway, naval base, air defense installations, and mine storage. A former U.S. Treasury sanctions official described the target selection plainly: "exactly the targets you neutralize before an amphibious or airborne assault."⁴
Two MEUs — approximately 4,700 to 5,000 Marines — are currently en route. An unnamed U.S. official told Axios: "[Trump] wants Hormuz open. If he has to take Kharg Island to make it happen, that's going to happen."²
Joe Kent served 11 combat deployments in Iraq fighting Iranian proxies. He held the highest level of intelligence clearance available in the U.S. government. He was, until March 17, Trump's Senate-confirmed Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. He described what Kharg would mean for those Marines in plain terms: "If you commit troops to that, they're essentially going to be used as bait — because Iran, regardless of how degraded we think some of their capabilities are, can pin down that island with a good deal of ballistic missile, a good deal of drone fire. They could essentially cut off the straits, and then any ship that goes to reinforce them, any airplane that goes to reinforce them — it's just a matter of time before they can pick them off as well."11
He continued: "If we lose lives, then we're stuck in this cycle of: we lost lives, we have to double down and avenge them, and we have to commit more. Taking the island didn't work. So now we just got to take all the beach heads and we'll secure the straits by having soldiers and marines on the shore — for how long? For what end? Once again."¹¹
The Quagmire
Assume the operation succeeds. Marines take Kharg Island. Then what?
Supply lines now run through a mined, hostile strait, under constant threat of drone and missile fire, with no defined endpoint. Iran's new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has already publicly threatened to "open other fronts" in the war.³ Holding Kharg does not end the war. It gives Iran a fixed, permanent, high-value target to bleed — one surrounded by the most flammable real estate on earth, 15 miles from the Iranian mainland.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies has identified three escalation trajectories from this point, and none of them are good.³ The first is straight-line escalation: indefinite attrition, sustained market disruption, a conflict that grinds without resolution. The second is exponential escalation: the Lebanon war intensifies, the Houthis enter the conflict, and the Bab al-Mandab — the chokepoint at the southern end of the Red Sea — closes. At that point, two of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints are simultaneously blocked. The third scenario is asymmetric escalation: Iran, stripped of much of its missile capacity, prosecutes the war indefinitely through drones — a capability that is, in the words of CSIS analysts, "far more resilient and difficult, if not impossible, to completely neutralize."³
There is no exit strategy. There is no articulated definition of victory. There is no plan for the day after. Kent put it directly: "The most important thing if you're going to commit troops to a fight is you have to state upfront what your strategic objective is. Why are we doing this? When this is all said and done, this will look like what? That has not been clearly fleshed out. That has not been clearly articulated."¹¹
It Gets Worse
Everything described in Part One — the $3.90 gas, the 45 million on the edge of hunger, the IEA invoking the 1970s — reflects the state of the world before American ground forces enter this conflict.
Analysts are already forecasting $150 a barrel or more if the war continues past April.⁹ A ground operation does not stabilize that trajectory. It detonates it. The fertilizer shortage deepens into a famine. The supply chain slowdown becomes a collapse. The shipping reroutes become permanent. The 45 million become more. And the families filling up at $3.90 a gallon this Saturday will look back on this week as the cheap days.
Where It All Started
On March 1, 2026 — the day after the first strikes — Benjamin Netanyahu stood on the roof of IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv and made a statement. He was not describing a response to an attack. He was not explaining a reluctant decision. He said: "The combination of forces enables us to do what I have longed to do for 40 years — to strike the terror regime decisively. That is what I promised — and that is what we will do."12
Forty years.
The Paper Trail
In the months before the war, Senator Lindsey Graham traveled to Tel Aviv to meet with Netanyahu. According to reporting by the Wall Street Journal, cited by Responsible Statecraft, that visit was specifically to coordinate how Netanyahu should lobby President Trump.13
The American negotiating team sent to discuss Iran's nuclear program did not include nuclear experts.¹³ This reportedly confused the Iranian side. The IAEA — including its Director General — and U.S. intelligence had both concluded that Iran was not close to a nuclear weapon and was not pursuing one.¹³ The Omani foreign minister flew to Washington and told U.S. officials that Iran had made concessions going beyond the 2015 nuclear deal — directly contradicting the account given by the American negotiator, Steve Witkoff.¹³ The Arms Control Association described Witkoff and his co-negotiator Jared Kushner as appearing to have "fatally misunderstood a series of basic technical and historical matters."¹³
According to at least three separate reports, Witkoff and Kushner told the White House on the eve of the campaign that Iran was using talks to buy time. Trump publicly said the pair "helped persuade him to go to war."¹³ Witkoff, speaking on Fox News the day the war began, said it had been "very, very clear that it was going to be impossible" to reach a diplomatic resolution. When asked about a specific Iranian offer, he claimed Iranian negotiators had told him: "We're not going to give you diplomatically what you couldn't take militarily." Third parties present at the negotiations told reporters that claim "simply never happened." A Gulf diplomat called it "inaccurate."¹³
Then there is Marco Rubio. In the days after the war began, the Secretary of State made a statement explaining why the United States had struck Iran preemptively. He said: "We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action. We knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces. And we knew that if we didn't preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties and perhaps even higher killed."¹¹
Joe Kent, who was still Director of the NCTC when Rubio said this, heard it and understood immediately what had been admitted. He said: "The imminent threat that the Secretary of State is describing is not from Iran. It's from Israel."¹¹
We don't need to wait for the people who sold this war to confess in writing before recognizing what is already visible. Based on the public record, the most likely reality is clear: Israel wanted this war, pushed for this war, and got the United States to help fight it. If that picture changes with new evidence, the analysis should change with it. But refusing to draw the obvious conclusion from the evidence already in front of us is not caution. It is paralysis dressed up as sophistication.
The Resignation
Joe Kent resigned on March 17, 2026 — nineteen days into the war. His resignation letter read: "I cannot in good conscience support the ongoing war in Iran. Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation."¹¹
He then gave two interviews — to Tucker Carlson and to Breaking Points — and said the following things, on the record, under his own name, with no financial incentive, no book to sell, no office to run for.
He said there was no intelligence indicating Iran was about to launch an attack. He said the Iranians, under Trump's second term, had shown a "very calculated approach to the escalation ladder" and were engaged in active negotiations with the United States when the strikes began. He said that in the leadup to this war — unlike the Twelve-Day War in June 2025, which had a month-long NSC process with all 18 intelligence agencies and the Joint Chiefs — "that process didn't play out." He described the decision as having been made by "a handful of small advisers" in a "bespoke process" at Mar-a-Lago and in the Situation Room. He said key decision-makers were not allowed to present their views to the president. He said it "seemed to be a foregone conclusion."¹¹
He said: "Israel got us into this war. Its lobby in the United States pressured the president, and its prime minister in Israel told the president, 'We're going without you. Join us because if you don't, your troops in the region, your interests in the region, your citizens in the region will all be at risk. You have no choice.' They led the way."¹¹
He said he was speaking because of a promise he made to himself after years of combat — after losing his wife in service. He said: "If I was ever in a position of responsibility or had a way to make my voice heard, I would be against something like this."¹¹
He is not the only one who said it. Pentagon officials told congressional staff, according to reporting cited by Reuters, that there was "zero intelligence" an attack from Iran was about to happen.¹
Who Wins. Who Loses. Who Pays.
Israel wins either way.
Every American strike that degrades Iran's military capacity serves Israel's strategic interests directly. Every Iranian strike that hits Gulf infrastructure — Saudi Arabia's oil facilities, Qatar's LNG terminals, the UAE's airports and data centers — weakens regional competitors that Israel has long sought to diminish. Israel is taking missiles and drones and Hezbollah rockets. These are real costs. But they are costs Israel chose, in pursuit of a war its prime minister said he had longed for forty years, entered with open eyes, and designed to serve Israeli strategic objectives. Netanyahu said so himself, the morning after it started.
Iran has little to lose — and knows it.
Iran has lived under sanctions, maximum pressure campaigns, proxy conflicts, and the constant threat of military action for decades. The regime was already fighting for its existence before the first bomb fell. For a government facing what it perceives as an existential threat, the strategic calculus changes: you fight harder when survival is the only objective. And Iran is not fighting badly. It is collecting higher revenues per barrel on oil it is selling through its own corridor. It is burning American interceptors worth $4 to $28 million against drones that cost $40,000 to produce, at a rate it can sustain indefinitely. It has opened fronts across 14 countries while taking hits that, however painful, have not broken it. A weakened Iran that survives this war will have demonstrated something the entire world is watching: that it deterred the United States from achieving its objectives.
The United States stands to lose the most.
We were not attacked. There was no imminent threat. A war of choice, initiated on behalf of another country's forty-year ambition, prosecuted through a process so compressed that the man whose job was to evaluate the threat resigned rather than be associated with it.
The cost asymmetry is not rhetorical. One Patriot interceptor — $4 million — is the equivalent of 80 to 200 Shahed drones. Iran can produce 10,000 of them a month. We cannot manufacture interceptors at anything approaching that rate, and we cannot bomb a production system that launches from a pickup truck and leaves no observable signature. We are burning an irreplaceable inventory against a renewable one. That is not a war we can win through attrition. It is a war we lose by continuing.
And then there are the Marines. Approximately 4,700 to 5,000 of them, heading toward a strait that has been mined, toward an island that has been fortified for exactly this scenario, toward a fight whose objectives have not been defined and whose exit has not been planned. They did not choose this war. They were sent into it — by people who will face no consequences if it goes wrong, for reasons that the administration's own officials have described, on the record, as insufficient.
The people who will pay are not the people who decided. They never are.
Let it be on record.
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Article Sources:
Jon Gambrell, "Iran war live updates: Trump says he is not putting troops anywhere as US continues strikes", AP News, March 19, 2026.
AP's live blog tracking the war's third week captures the full scope of the military situation as of March 19: the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed to nearly all traffic, at least 13 U.S. military members killed, Brent crude briefly topping $119/barrel, Trump's public denial of troop deployments alongside the Pentagon's simultaneous preparations for them, and the aerial campaign launched to reopen the strait. The blog also cites Reuters reporting that Pentagon officials told congressional staff there was "zero intelligence" an attack from Iran was imminent — directly corroborating Kent's account of how the war was started.
Thomas Newdick and Joseph Trevithick, "USS Boxer: The Second Amphibious Assault Ship Now Heading to the Middle East", The War Zone, March 20, 2026.
The War Zone's detailed reporting on the accelerated deployment of the 11th MEU aboard USS Boxer — joining the 31st MEU aboard USS Tripoli already transiting from the Pacific — establishes the combined force of approximately 4,700 to 5,000 Marines now heading toward the Persian Gulf under Operation Epic Fury. The piece also cites CBS News confirming that senior military commanders have submitted specific requests for ground force deployment options, quotes an unnamed U.S. official saying Trump is prepared to take Kharg Island if necessary to reopen the Strait, and documents Trump's simultaneous March 20 Truth Social post suggesting the operation may be "winding down" — a contradiction the article notes without resolution.
Mona Yacoubian, "Iran's War Strategy: Don't Calibrate—Escalate", Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 21, 2026.
The Director of the Middle East Program at CSIS provides the most analytically rigorous account of Iran's escalation strategy available in open-source reporting. Yacoubian documents the horizontal escalation — Iran striking 14 countries in the conflict's first week, including triggering NATO air defenses in Turkey and hitting a British base in Cyprus — and the vertical escalation, including the category-mirroring doctrine illustrated most precisely by Iran's desalination plant response. The piece also identifies the three future escalation scenarios (straight-line, exponential, asymmetric) and notes that in all three, the United States faces sustained costs without a clear path to resolution. The IRGC safe corridor through Iranian territorial waters — allowing vetted vessels from China, India, and others to transit while the Strait remains closed to everyone else — is documented here, establishing that Iran is simultaneously blockading the world's oil supply and profiting from the price spike it caused.
Nandika Chatterjee, "Kharg Island: What to Know About the Iranian Oil Hub in Trump's Sights", Time, March 14, 2026.
Time's explainer on Kharg Island is the single most important source for understanding why the potential ground operation is so dangerous. It confirms CENTCOM's account of the March 13 strikes — 90+ targets, runway destroyed, naval base gone, air defenses eliminated, mine storage destroyed — and identifies this target selection as consistent with pre-assault preparation rather than standalone deterrence. Expert analysis from former U.S. Treasury sanctions official Miad Maleki and Quincy Institute resident fellow Amir Handjani establishes the strategic stakes: Kharg handles roughly 90% of Iran's crude oil exports ($53 billion annually), its deep-water berths are irreplaceable, and an invasion would give Iran a fixed high-value target to strike from the mainland 15 miles away. The piece also documents the Iran-Iraq War precedent — repeated Iraqi bombing of Kharg throughout the 1980s failed to stop Iranian oil exports — and notes that Iran has spent the intervening decades hardening the island specifically against this scenario. Trump's 1988 statement that he would "go in and take it" is included, establishing that this has been his stated intention for nearly four decades.
Kelly A. Grieco, "Don't Count Launches: Misreading Iran's Drone Capacity", War on the Rocks, March 16, 2026.
A Stimson Center senior fellow and Georgetown University adjunct professor of security studies methodically dismantles the Pentagon's claim that an 83% reduction in drone launches indicates Iran's drone capability is being systematically eliminated. Grieco distinguishes between behavior indicators and actual battle damage assessment — a distinction Joint doctrine makes explicit — and identifies four alternative explanations for the reduced launch tempo: tactical recalibration using Russian lessons from Ukraine, deliberate stockpiling for a future saturation attack, repositioning toward the Strait of Hormuz, and sustainable coercive pressure as a strategy in itself. The piece documents the Shahed-136's design features that make it effectively unbombable: pickup truck launch, no fixed infrastructure, no detectable storage signature. Historical precedents — the Scud hunt in 1991 (not a single confirmed mobile kill), Kosovo 1999, 900+ strikes in Yemen failing to suppress Houthi launches — establish that the United States has never successfully suppressed a mobile, dispersed drone or missile capability through airpower alone. The UK Foreign Office-funded Center for Information Resilience estimate of 10,000 Shaheds per month in production capacity is cited here, alongside a pre-war stockpile estimate of "several thousand to well above 10,000."
Oliver Milman, "US Interest in Electric Vehicles Surges as Gas Prices Jump Amid Iran War", The Guardian, March 21, 2026.
The Guardian's reporting, citing AAA data directly, establishes the current national average of $3.90 per gallon as of March 21 — the highest level in nearly three years. Against a pre-war baseline of $2.98 per gallon on February 26, this represents a 31% increase in three weeks.
Christopher Rugaber, "The Iran War and Surging Oil Prices Are Affecting Consumers. Here's How.", AP via PBS NewsHour, March 11, 2026.
AP's consumer impact analysis documents the downstream effects of oil price disruption on the American economy. Diesel had risen 28% to $4.83 per gallon by March 11. Patrick Penfield, professor of supply chain practice at Syracuse University, notes that fuel accounts for 50 to 60% of the total operating cost of shipping goods by sea, meaning the price shock propagates through every consumer good that moves by truck or ship. JPMorgan economists projected that U.S. inflation could rise from 2.4% in January to 3% or higher; EY-Parthenon economist Gregory Daco estimated monthly inflation in March alone could hit 1% — "the highest monthly increase in four years." Michigan State food economist David Ortega warned that if oil prices remain elevated for a month or more, grocery prices follow.
Trading Economics, "EU Natural Gas Price — Chart, Historical Data", accessed March 21, 2026.
Trading Economics' commodity data documents the full scope of energy price disruption across European markets as of March 20: TTF natural gas up 88.37% in one month; UK gas up 96.69%; Brent crude up 56.93%; heating oil up 104.49% year-over-year. European energy markets have experienced a near-doubling in one month, driven by Iran's strike on Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG facility, the attack on Iran's South Pars gas field, and the Strait closure.
Malcolm Moore, "Iran War Is the 'Greatest Threat to Global Energy in History', Warns IEA", Financial Times, March 20, 2026.
IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol states that more oil has been lost than during the twin shocks of the 1970s, that the volume of gas cut off is twice what Europe lost from Russia in 2022, and that the situation's "depth and consequences" are not well understood by political leaders. The IEA has released 400 million barrels from global strategic reserves — 20% of total holdings. Analysts are forecasting $150 per barrel or more if the conflict continues past April. The IEA is recommending measures — working from home, avoiding air travel, highway speed reductions — "last seen in the 1970s."
Tania Karas, "Devex Dish: How the Iran War Could Trigger a Global Food Crisis", Devex, March 18, 2026.
The World Food Programme estimates that almost 45 million more people could be pushed into acute hunger if this conflict does not end by midyear — on top of the 318 million already food-insecure worldwide. WFP's Sudan operation depends on grain shipped from India through the Red Sea; those ships are now rerouting 9,000 kilometers around Africa, with risk insurance surcharges of $2,000 to $4,000 per container. The FAO confirms that at least 30% of the world's fertilizer supply moves through the Strait of Hormuz, and that unlike oil, there is no internationally coordinated strategic reserve for nitrogen fertilizer.
Tucker Carlson, "Joe Kent Reveals All in First Interview Since Resigning as Trump's Counterterrorism Director", Tucker Carlson Network, March 18, 2026; and Saagar Enjeti, "Saagar X Joe Kent: RESIGNATION, Israeli NUKES, Epstein, Charlie Kirk, Mike Huckabee", Breaking Points, March 20, 2026.
Joe Kent served 11 combat deployments, including approximately five years in Iraq fighting Iranian proxies. He was a Gold Star husband — his late wife Shannon was killed in service. He held the highest level of intelligence clearance available in the U.S. government. He was Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, a presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate. He resigned March 17, 2026 — nineteen days into the war — and gave these two interviews with no book to sell, no office to seek, and no financial incentive. His accounts of the pre-war decision process, the absence of an NSC process, the role of Israeli pressure, the Rubio admission, and the tactical assessment of the Kharg Island operation are direct testimony from the official whose institutional responsibility was to evaluate exactly these questions.
Lazar Berman, "Israeli Strikes on Iran Will Intensify Amid 'Painful Days at Home,' Says Netanyahu", Times of Israel, March 1, 2026.
Netanyahu's statement from the roof of IDF headquarters on March 1, 2026 — the morning after the first strikes — in his own words: "The combination of forces enables us to do what I have longed to do for 40 years — to strike the terror regime decisively." He was not describing a reluctant response to an attack. He was describing the fulfillment of a four-decade ambition. The United States provided the combination of forces that made it possible.
Branko Marcetic, "Not So Diplomatic: Witkoff, Kushner, and Trump's March to War in Iran", Responsible Statecraft, March 14, 2026.
Responsible Statecraft's investigation synthesizes reporting from the Wall Street Journal, multiple news outlets, and direct accounts of the pre-war diplomatic process. Senator Graham's coordination with Netanyahu on how to lobby Trump is documented through the WSJ. The absence of nuclear experts on the U.S. negotiating team, the Omani foreign minister's contradictory account of Iranian concessions, the Arms Control Association's assessment of Witkoff and Kushner's technical misunderstandings, and Witkoff's claimed Iranian quote — denied by third parties present at the negotiations and called "inaccurate" by a Gulf diplomat — are all documented with full sourcing.
Extremely well-thought out and well-written. I think this war will go very badly for us. It's a shame so many people had to die because of one man's (DJT's) weakness.
We have to remember that Saladin--the guy we beheaded--was considered one of the most brilliant military minds of all time. And if he left any archives, those guys prolly still have them.